

SA 7. Mr. RUBIO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 2, line 10, insert “30 days after the Director of National Intelligence submits to Congress an unclassified certification that there are no longer any threats in or emanating out of Iraq to United States persons and personnel by Iranian-backed militias and proxies” after “hereby repealed”.

SA 8. Mr. CRUZ submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. REMEDIES FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES DISCHARGED OR SUBJECT TO ADVERSE ACTION UNDER THE COVID-19 VACCINE MANDATE.

(a) **LIMITATION ON IMPOSITION OF NEW MANDATE.**—The Secretary of Defense may not issue any COVID-19 vaccine mandate as a replacement for the mandate rescinded under section 525 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 absent a further act of Congress expressly authorizing a replacement mandate.

(b) **REMEDIES.**—Section 736 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81; 10 U.S.C. 1161 note prec.) is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking “**TO OBEY LAWFUL ORDER TO RECEIVE**” and inserting “**TO RECEIVE**”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “a lawful order” and inserting “an order”; and

(B) by striking “shall be” and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting “shall be an honorable discharge.”;

(3) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (e); and

(4) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsections:

“(b) **PROHIBITION ON ADVERSE ACTION.**—The Secretary of Defense may not take any adverse action against a covered member based solely on the refusal of such member to receive a vaccine for COVID-19.

“(c) **REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR A COVERED MEMBER DISCHARGED OR SUBJECT TO ADVERSE ACTION BASED ON COVID-19 STATUS.**—At the election of a covered member discharged or subject to adverse action based on the member’s COVID-19 vaccination status, and upon application through a process established by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary shall—

“(1) adjust to ‘honorable discharge’ the status of the member if—

“(A) the member was separated from the Armed Forces based solely on the failure of the member to obey an order to receive a vaccine for COVID-19; and

“(B) the discharge status of the member would have been an ‘honorable discharge’ but for the refusal to obtain such vaccine;”

“(2) reinstate the member to service at the highest grade held by the member immediately prior to the involuntary separation, allowing, however, for any reduction in rank that was not related to the member’s COVID-19 vaccination status, with an effective date of reinstatement as of the date of involuntary separation;

“(3) for any member who was subject to any adverse action other than involuntary separation based solely on the member’s COVID-19 vaccination status—

“(A) restore the member to the highest grade held prior to such adverse action, al-

lowing, however, for any reduction in rank that was not related to the member’s COVID-19 vaccination status, with an effective date of reinstatement as of the date of involuntary separation; and

“(B) compensate such member for any pay and benefits lost as a result of such adverse action;

“(4) expunge from the service record of the member any adverse action, to include non-punitive adverse action and involuntary separation, as well as any reference to any such adverse action, based solely on COVID-19 vaccination status; and

“(5) include the time of involuntary separation of the member reinstated under paragraph (2) in the computation of the retired or retiree pay of the member.

“(d) **RETENTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNVACCINATED MEMBERS.**—The Secretary of Defense shall—

“(1) make every effort to retain covered members who are not vaccinated against COVID-19 and provide such members with professional development, promotion and leadership opportunities, and consideration equal to that of their peers;

“(2) only consider the COVID-19 vaccination status of a covered member in making deployment, assignment, and other operational decisions where—

“(A) the law or regulations of a foreign country require covered members to be vaccinated against COVID-19 in order to enter that country; and

“(B) the covered member’s presence in that foreign country is necessary in order to perform their assigned role; and

“(3) for purposes of deployments, assignments, and operations described in paragraph (2), create a process to provide COVID-19 vaccination exemptions to covered members with—

“(A) a natural immunity to COVID-19;

“(B) an underlying health condition that would make COVID-19 vaccination a greater risk to that individual than the general population; or

“(C) sincerely held religious beliefs in conflict with receiving the COVID-19 vaccination.

“(e) **APPLICABILITY OF REMEDIES CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION.**—The prohibitions and remedies described in this section shall apply to covered members regardless of whether or not they sought an accommodation to any Department of Defense COVID-19 vaccination policy on any grounds.”.

SA 9. Mr. CRUZ submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 2, line 3, strike “The Authorization” and insert the following:

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Article II of the United States Constitution empowers the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to direct the use of military force to protect the Nation from an attack or threat of imminent attack.

(2) This authority empowers the President to use force against forces of Iran, a state responsible for conducting and directing attacks against United States forces in the Middle East and to take actions for the purpose of ending Iran’s escalation of attacks on, and threats to, United States interests.

(3) The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is not independently required to authorize the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2).

(b) **REPEAL.**—The Authorization

SA 10. Mr. JOHNSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING LARGE POWER TRANSFORMERS.

The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct an assessment of existing large power transformers in the United States, identify Government resources that could be leveraged to enhance the domestic manufacturing of large power transformers, and identify any authorities needed to provide such assistance.

SA 11. Mr. JOHNSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 3. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR AGREEMENT OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY’S FINAL REPORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the “No WHO Pandemic Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act”.

(b) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On December 1, 2021, at the second special session of the World Health Assembly (referred to in this section as the “WHA”) decided—

(A) to establish an intergovernmental negotiating body (referred to in this section as the “INB”) to draft and negotiate a WHO convention (referred to in this section as the “Convention”), agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, with a view to adoption under article 19 or any other provision of the WHO Constitution; and

(B) that the INB shall submit a progress report to the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working draft of the convention for consideration by the Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled to take place beginning on March 18, 2024.

(2) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and June 6 through 8 and 15 through 17, 2022, the INB held its inaugural meeting at which the Director-General proposed the following 5 themes to guide the INB’s work in drafting the Convention:

(A) Building national, regional, and global capacities based on a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

(B) Establishing global access and benefit sharing for all pathogens, and determining a global policy for the equitable production and distribution of countermeasures.

(C) Establishing robust systems and tools for pandemic preparedness and response.

(D) Establishing a long-term plan for sustainable financing to ensure support for global health threat management and response systems.

(E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its mandate as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work, including for pandemic preparedness and response.

(3) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held its second meeting at which it agreed that the Convention would be adopted under

article 19 of the WHO Constitution and legally binding on the parties.

(4) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB held its third meeting at which it accepted a conceptual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to prepare a zero draft for consideration at the INB's next meeting.

(5) In early January 2023, an initial draft of the Convention was sent to WHO member states in advance of its formal introduction at the fourth meeting of the INB. The draft includes broad and binding provisions, including rules governing parties' access to pathogen genomic sequences and how the products or benefits of such access are to be distributed.

(6) On February 27 through March 3, 2023, the INB held its fourth meeting at which it—

(A) formally agreed to the draft distributed in January as the basis for commencing negotiations; and

(B) established an April 14, 2023 deadline for member states to propose any changes to the text.

(7) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual states that when "determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole" and includes the following criteria to be considered when determining whether an international agreement should take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement:

(A) "The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the nation as a whole".

(B) "Whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws".

(C) "Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress".

(D) "Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements".

(E) "The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement".

(F) "The degree of formality desired for an agreement".

(G) "The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement".

(H) "The general international practice as to similar agreements".

(c) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) a significant segment of the American public is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organization, its leadership, and its independence from the pernicious political influence of certain member states, including the People's Republic of China;

(2) the Senate strongly prefers that any agreement related to pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response adopted by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring;

(3) the scope of the agreement which the INB has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Director-General, is so broad that any application of the factors referred to in subsection (b)(11) will weigh strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and

(4) given the level of public distrust, any relevant new agreement by the World Health Assembly which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for Senate ratification should not be agreed to or implemented by the United States.

(d) APPLICABILITY OF SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

any convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the recommendations, report, or work of the International Negotiating Body established by the second special session of the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring.

SA 12. Mr. JOHNSON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 3. AGREEMENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN DEEMED TREATIES SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.

(a) TREATY SUBJECT TO ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any agreement reached by the President with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran is deemed to be a treaty that is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States requiring that the treaty is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring.

(b) LIMITATION ON SANCTIONS RELIEF.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of sanctions under any other provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future, unless the agreement is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate as a treaty and receives the concurrence of two-thirds of Senators.

SA 13. Mr. SCOTT of Florida (for himself, Mr. TILLIS, and Mr. CASSIDY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 316, to repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a joint select committee of Congress to be known as the "Joint Select Committee on Afghanistan" (in this section referred to as the "Joint Committee").

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Joint Committee shall be composed of 12 members appointed pursuant to paragraph (2).

(2) APPOINTMENT.—Members of the Joint Committee shall be appointed as follows:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives shall appoint 3 members from among Members of the House of Representatives.

(3) CO-CHAIRS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Two of the appointed members of the Joint Committee shall serve as co-chairs. The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate shall jointly appoint one co-chair, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the minority leader of the Senate shall jointly appoint the second co-chair. The co-chairs shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) STAFF DIRECTOR.—The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall hire the staff director of the Joint Committee.

(4) DATE.—Members of the Joint Committee shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(5) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT.—Members shall be appointed for the life of the Joint Committee. Any vacancy in the Joint Committee shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the vacancy occurs, in the same manner as the original designation was made. If a member of the Joint Committee ceases to be a Member of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be, the member is no longer a member of the Joint Committee and a vacancy shall exist.

(c) INVESTIGATION AND REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Joint Committee shall conduct an investigation and submit to Congress a report on the United States 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A summary of any intelligence reports that indicated an imminent threat at the Hamid Karzai International Airport preceding the deadly attack on August 26, 2021, and the risks to United States and allied country civilians as well as Afghan partners for various United States withdrawal scenarios.

(B) A summary of any intelligence reports that indicated that withdrawing military personnel and closing United States military installations in Afghanistan before evacuating civilians would negatively affect the evacuation of United States citizens, green card holders, and Afghan partners and thus put them at risk.

(C) A full review of planning by the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense for a noncombatant evacuation from Afghanistan, including details of all scenarios used by the Department of State or the Department of Defense to plan and prepare for noncombatant evacuation operations.

(D) An analysis of the relationship between the retrograde and noncombatant evacuation operation plans and operations.

(E) A description of any actions that were taken by the United States Government to protect the safety of United States forces and neutralize threats in any withdrawal scenarios.